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Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Advance Access published online on June 22, 2009

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, doi:10.1093/reep/rep003
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Greenhouse Gas Auctions and Taxes: Some Political Economy Considerations

Robert W. Hahn*

* Robert Hahn is the executive director of the Reg-Markets Center at AEI and a senior visiting fellow at Oxford. He would like to thank Peter Cramton, Larry Goulder, Allan Ingraham, Al McGartland, Gilbert Metcalf, Ian Parry, Eric Posner, Robert Stavins, David Victor, Michael Wara, and Jonathan Wiener for helpful comments. Caroline Cecot, Poh Lin Tan, Douglas Walton, Adam Schmidt, and Molly Wells provided valuable research assistance. This research was supported by the Reg-Markets Center. The views expressed in this paper reflect solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which he is affiliated.

Many economists suggest that a cap-and-trade program and a carbon tax represent promising mechanisms for addressing climate change. A potentially attractive feature of both policies is that they have the potential to recycle revenues in an efficient manner. In the case of cap and trade, this would involve using auction revenues; in the case of a tax, it would involve using tax revenues. This article evaluates various arguments for auctions and taxes in light of political realities and finds that the enthusiasm for auctions and taxes has not been accompanied by sober assessments of whether and how the revenues would actually be used. Most of the evidence suggests that at least some of the revenues would not be spent wisely. Specifically, the article urges the government to compare a realistic set of policy options, while recognizing that the feasibility of different types of mechanisms can change over time. Furthermore, it is suggested that the introduction of political economy considerations may lead to an optimal level of pollution control that is less stringent than conventional economic analysis would suggest.


JEL Classification: D44, D61, G18, H2, P16, Q5, Q54


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